A chokepoint at the center of a widening crisis

The ongoing United States-Israeli war on Iran has pushed the Strait of Hormuz into the middle of a highly layered geopolitical mess. Since fighting began in late February 2026, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has repeatedly threatened or targeted vessels and at times suspended transit through the strait. The International Energy Agency has described the resulting shock as the most acute supply disruption ever seen in the global energy market. Not exactly a minor traffic issue.

Against that backdrop, three broad scenarios stand out for what could happen next: regional military action, a joint international operation, or phased negotiations. Pakistan’s mediation, one of the few diplomatic channels still functioning between Washington and Tehran, could matter in two of those paths.

Scenario one: Regional military action without the US

The first possibility is a coalition of regional states, mainly members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Jordan, deciding to act on their own to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. In this version, they would try to restore shipping without direct US operational involvement.

That could happen if economic losses drag on, diplomacy runs out of road, or domestic politics push leaders to show they can act without waiting for Washington to hand them a script.

The problem is one of capability asymmetry. Gulf states have spent heavily over the last two decades modernising their armed forces, but that does not automatically give them the integrated naval power, mine-clearing capacity, or air-defense suppression needed to deal with Iran’s layered asymmetric threat in the strait.

There is also the awkward matter of coalition discipline. Each state would have an incentive to let others shoulder the danger while it tries to avoid Iranian retaliation against energy infrastructure. Collective security sounds neat until everyone starts checking who else is volunteering first.

Even more serious, a unilateral regional campaign could trigger a rapid escalation. Iran’s doctrine of “forward defence” suggests that pressure on the strait would likely be met with pressure on Gulf oil facilities and population centers.

Pakistan has repeatedly warned against escalation and tried to preserve diplomatic space to prevent exactly that outcome. If the region moved to military action without prior diplomacy, Pakistan’s mediation channel would probably fail, removing one of the few remaining crisis-management tools.

Scenario two: A regional coalition joins a US-led operation

The second scenario envisions regional states formally lining up with the US in a coordinated military effort to restore freedom of navigation. In this version, the US would lead operations, while Gulf states would provide bases, political cover, and additional assets. Other states could also join.

This fits the standard logic of coercive diplomacy, where limited force is used to pressure an adversary into changing behavior without sliding into full-scale war. The late American political scientist Alexander George argued that coercive diplomacy works only if three conditions are met: credible capability, the adversary’s sense that costs are too high, and a way for that adversary to save face on the way out.

Tehran’s counterproposal to the US 15-point negotiating plan suggests it is bargaining, not simply slamming the door. That means the second and third conditions may still exist, at least in part.

But there is a complication, because there is always a complication. Israel’s public opposition to any negotiated settlement, plus its concern that US talks through intermediaries might weaken its own strategy, could strain the coalition. That would undermine the first condition: credible capability.

In this scenario, Pakistan would shift from mediator to diplomatic buffer, working to keep lines open even during active hostilities. Its ability to speak with both Tehran and Washington would make it a crucial backchannel.

A hybrid version could eventually emerge: sustained military pressure on one side, indirect negotiations through Pakistan on the other, and an attempt to produce a face-saving Iranian withdrawal from the strait in exchange for verifiable sanctions relief.

Scenario three: Iran keeps the strait under pressure

The third, and most plausible near-term scenario, is that Iran maintains its control over the strait while using the threat of prolonged closure as leverage in talks with the US. This is classic coercive bargaining, in the sense described by American scholar Thomas Schelling: the use of shared risk to force political concessions without committing to outright war.

Iran’s selective de-escalation move on March 26 fits this logic. Tehran allowed vessels from China, Russia, India, Iraq and Pakistan to pass through the strait. By deciding who gets through and who does not, Iran showed it still had control, rewarded politically aligned states, and sent Washington a simple message: full reopening depends on political accommodation.

That kind of move is what crisis bargaining theorists call a limited probe. It is reversible, it tests the other side’s resolve, and it preserves leverage. No one is exactly volunteering to give up leverage in a crisis.

Tehran’s counteroffer, including demands for reparations and sovereignty over the strait, starts from an intentionally extreme position. That allows room for concessions later while keeping the posture of strength intact.

This is also the scenario in which Pakistan matters most. The negotiations format being discussed in Islamabad is precisely the sort of indirect, high-level, face-saving channel that extended bargaining needs if it is going to produce anything other than more damage.

A phased arrangement linking partial sanctions relief to gradual reopening of the strait, backed by a multilateral navigation framework under United Nations supervision, would be the most institutionally durable outcome available in this scenario.

What is most likely

These three paths are not separate tracks neatly waiting their turn. They are competing pressures operating at the same time inside one crisis.

What happens next will depend on the interaction between military capability, coercive signalling, and whether diplomatic exits remain available. Of the three scenarios, the third is the most likely in the near term, provided Pakistan’s mediation channel stays intact and the US-Israeli alliance does not fracture in a way that either ends escalation or accelerates it beyond control.

The first two scenarios depend on diplomacy failing, and both carry outsized escalation risks compared with whatever gains they might bring. That is usually how these things go: the options that look most decisive are often the ones most likely to make the problem worse.

This crisis is not simply a choice between war and peace. It is a structured bargaining contest in which mutual vulnerability, intermediary channels, and face-saving exits all exist, but only just.

Preserving Pakistan’s mediatory role, keeping Gulf states in a de-escalatory posture, and narrowing the gap between Washington and Tehran remain the most realistic basis for a durable, even if incomplete, settlement.